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Whilemuchattentionhasbeenpaidtothevulnerabilityofcomputernetworkstonodeandlinkfailure,there
is limited systematic understanding of the factors that determine the likelihood that a node (computer) is
compromised. We therefore collect threat log data in a university network to study the patterns of threat
activity for individual hosts. We relate this information to the properties of each host as observed through
network-wide scans, establishing associations between the network services a host is running and the kinds
ofthreatstowhichitissusceptible.Weproposeamethodologytoassociateservicestothreatsinspiredbythe
tools used in genetics to identify statistical associations between mutations and diseases. The proposed
approachallowsustodetermineprobabilitiesofinfectiondirectlyfromobservation,offeringanautomated
high-throughput strategy to develop comprehensive metrics for cyber-security.
G
iven the extent to which critical infrastructures and day-to-day human and economic activity are
dependent on secure information and communication networks, we must understand their weaknesses
and uncover the risks that threaten their integrity
1–3. Much work has been devoted in the past years to
understanding theglobalrisksresultingfromnoderemovalincommunicationandinfrastructurenetworks
3–6,or
posed by viruses and malware
7. Less is known, however, about the specific risks that pertain to compromising
single nodes.
As cyber-threats proliferate both in their volume and complexity, new strategies are necessary to prevent
intrusions and to cope with their impact
8. Current research in cyber-security focuses on characterizing and
modelling specific attacks, aiming to understand the mechanisms of infiltration, detection and mitigation
9–17.
Despite significant efforts in this direction, the number of attacks continues to increase each year
18,19. The
constantly increasing vulnerabilities and intrusions have lead to a paradigm shift in security: it is now widely
recognized that absolute security is unattainable
20,21. While very effective methods to detect and aggregate
software vulnerabilities have been developed, determining actual risks and probabilities of compromise largely
reliesonexpertopinionandheuristics
22–25.Instead,weneedsystematicmethodstoestimatethemagnitudeofthe
potential risk by determining the probability that a system is compromised and the risk associated with specific
settings and configurations
26. Understanding the nature and the components of the current risks could help us
devote resources to most efficiently reduce the chance of intrusion.
Inthisworkweintroduce anunbiased, context-free andhigh-throughput statisticalframework toevaluate the
susceptibility of a computer to individual threats. By combining infection data from threat logs with network
scans we identify correlations between the network services detected on a host and the threats affecting it. The
proposed method offers a systematic framework to identify new attack vectors and to evaluate the role of
individual factors contributing to the susceptibility to each threat.
Data collection
To understand the recurring threats experienced by a large computer network, we collected the threat logs of an
Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDS/IPS) protecting a university network of approximately 30, 000
hosts. The IDS/IPS monitors incoming and outgoing traffic, searching for matching signatures from a threat
database. Each positive match is logged with a time stamp, source and target IP addresses as well as the name
and identification number of the detected threat. A small fraction of the detected threats (,3.2%) originate within
the network. Since the threats in the database correspond to well documented malicious activity and constitute
violations of security policies established by the network administrators, we assume that a threat originating within
the University network is evidence that the corresponding host at the source IP address has been compromised. Our
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beginning in September 2012, with approximately 16 million entries.
To remotely gather information about hosts in the network, we
also performed full network scans of all IP addresses within the
university, obtaining the list of network services running on all hosts
found. A total of 11, 726 hosts were successfully scanned, identifying
464 distinct services. In this sample, 10, 560 hosts were found in the
logstohavebeencompromisedbyatleastoneof278distinctthreats.
Results
Correlations between services and threats. Our starting hypothesis
is that the probability that a host is compromised by a specific threat
is largely determined by the set of reachable services running on it
27.
Indeed, many attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities in specific
network services to bypass authentication and gain access
28.
Additionally, certain types of malware may autonomously scan for
services to identify potential targets, or even actively open ports after
infection.Furthermore,thepresenceofspecificservicesonahostcan
be indicative of the ways in which the host is used, its intended
purpose or its user’s security awareness, allowing us to estimate the
host’s susceptibility to specific threats.
Evidence for this hypothesis is provided in Figure 1a, showing the
correlations between services and threats. We define the threat pro-
fileofhostiasvectorv
i,wherevi
k representsthefractionoflogentries
for hosti that correspond to threatk, and its service conformation as
s
i, where si
l is the number of instances of service l running on host i.
Wecalculater(v
i,v
j)infunctionofr(s
i,s
j)forallpairsofhostsiandj,
where r is the Pearson correlation. The blue line is the expectation
value obtained under randomization of the data that removes all
potential correlations between services and threats. We find that,
onaverage,thecorrelationbetweenthreatprofilesformosthostpairs
remains around the values expected in the random case. However,
for host pairs with high correlation between their services (r(s
i,s
j) .
0.8) the average correlation between their threat profiles increases
sharply. This means that hosts running similar services have a sig-
nificantly increased likelihood of being compromised by the same
threats. This likelihood is maximal for hosts with identical services
(r(s
i,s
j) 5 1).
Figure1bshowsthreeexamplessupportingthehypothesisthatthe
presence of specific network services is a determining factor for the
susceptibility to certain threats. Indeed, we find that a computer
running the ssh service is 16 times more likely to be flagged for the
Figure 1 | Correlating threats and services. (a) Pairs of hosts running similar services have an increased likelihood of being compromised by the same
threats. The plot shows the mean value of the correlation between threat profiles as a function of the correlations between services for all pairs of
hosts, indicating that the likelihood is maximal for computers running the same services. The blue line represents the expectation value for random
resamplingofthedata.AsthePearsoncorrelationisnotdefinedforaconstantsignal,theplotexcludeshostsforwhichnothreatsornoserviceshavebeen
found. (b) Odds ratios for the most common threats in the presence of three services: ssh, flexlm and ftp. The presence of certain services drastically
increases the odds of being compromised by specific threats.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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without that service. More dramatically, a host running the ftp ser-
viceis678times morelikelytotriggeralertsforChrome’s FTPPWD
response vulnerability, and hosts running flexlm are about 370 times
morelikelytobeinfectedbytheJBossWorm(CVE-2010-0738inthe
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Database, www.cve.mitre.
org).
Case-control study. The ability of a threat to compromise a host
depends on a combination of factors, from the software running on
the host and its level of exposure to the user’s behavior and security
awareness, to name only a few. Yet, the finding that hosts running
similar services are susceptible to similar threats suggests that
significant aspects of these factors are represented in the specific
combination of network services present on a host. Therefore, to
understand a system’s risks we must systematically untangle the
correlations between individual services and threats. This is
traditionally done through domain experience and contextual
knowledge—system administrators must constantly stay informed
about current trends pertaining to their system and the type of
services they run. However, given the rapidly evolving complexity
of both threats and services, this is a difficult and inefficient task.
Next we show that we can automate this process by relying on tools
borrowed from genetics.
We structure our analysis as a standard case-control study. We
consider a binary state model in which a given threat has either been
detected on a host or not, and the host is either running a given
network service or not. Our case-hosts for the study of a specific
threat are therefore all the hosts on which that threat has been
detected by the IDS/IPS. All hosts on which the threat has not been
observed serve as the control group.
For a given threat k, the group of case-hosts Ak that have been
infected by the threat and the group of control hosts Ck are given by
Ak~ i : vi
kw0

ð1Þ
Ck~ i : vi
k~0

: ð2Þ
Foreachservicethesetwogroupsaresplitintohoststhatarerunning
the service and hosts that are not. Since we consider each service as a
riskfactor,werefertohostsrunningaspecificserviceasexposed.For
a given service l under scrutiny, the different groups Ak~k
lz|Ak
l{
and Ck~Ck
lz|Ck
l{ are given by
Ak
lz~ i [ Ak : si
lw0

ð3Þ
Ak
l ~ i [ Ak : si
l~0

ð4Þ
for the exposed and unexposed case-hosts, respectively, and
Ck
lz~ i [ Ck : si
lw0

ð5Þ
Ck
l ~ i [ Ck : si
l~0

ð6Þ
fortheexposedandunexposedcontrols,wherethesymbols1and2
correspond to the service running and not running on the hosts,
respectively. With this, we construct a 2 3 2 contingency table as
shown in Table I.
Determining whether service l is significantly associated with
threat k requires us to evaluate the statistical differences between
the two columns of this table. This association problem is equivalent
to that encountered in genetic epidemiology, where the goal is to
assesstheimpactofspecificgeneticmutationsoncomplexdiseases
29,
a problem addressed using genome-wide association studies
(GWAS)
30. In these studies, a large number of genetic markers along
theentiregenomearecomparedbetweenapopulationofhealthyand
disease-affected individuals. GWAS offers a high-throughput
method for the unbiased identification of mutation-genotype
associations.
We equate the set of all scanned network services to the set of
chosen mutations (biomarkers) in a GWAS. The presence of a given
service on a host corresponds to the presence of a certain allele
(genetic variant) for a given gene. Therefore, our problem has an
identical mathematical formulation to the problem of genetic asso-
ciation, in which case patients play the role of hosts that have been
compromised by a specific threat of interest. A statistical association
is then evaluated by calculating the statistical significance (p-value)
of the discrepancy between the distribution of variants for each gene
in the population of individuals with the disease and the distribution
of the same variants in a population of healthy individuals
31.
Inour model,wemeasure the riskposedbyaservice, regardless of
how many instances are running on a given host. In genetics, this
corresponds to a common dominant model of genetic penetrance,
such that the presence of a given (dominant) variant of a gene is
sufficienttocauseanassociatedphenotype,regardlessofthenumber
of copies present. We resort to the Fisher exact test to evaluate the
statistical significance of the associations between threats and ser-
vices. In the case of GWAS, logistic regressions are also commonly
used to evaluate statistical significance when the considered genetic
model allows for different values of the penetrance (e.g. additive or
multiplicative) for the different possibilities of homozygous and het-
erozygous cases. The Fisher test used here assumes that the distribu-
tions of exposed and unexposed hosts are statistically identical for
both the case and the control groups. In other words, all computers
are equally likely to be compromised by the threat, regardless of
whether they are running or not the considered service. Therefore,
any discrepancies in the proportions of compromised hosts between
exposed and non-exposed hosts should be due to chance. The test
provides the probability of observing the proportions measured in
thedataunderthenullhypothesis.Theoutcomeisthep-valueforthe
significance of the association, which, if smaller than an established
threshold,indicatesthatthenullhypothesisisfalse.Therefore,inthis
case there is a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of
falling victim to threat k between hosts that are running service l and
hosts that are not.
This allows us to construct a standard Manhattan plot for each
threat, illustrated in Fig. 2 for three different threats. The plots show
thenegativelogarithmofthep-valueforeachservicewiththethresh-
oldforsignificancesetat0.01,multipliedbyanadditionalBonferroni
correction. Each dot is colored according to the sign of the correla-
tion: red dots above the threshold indicate a positive association
between the service and the threat; green dots denote negative asso-
ciations. The resulting plot summarizes the risk profile of a threat.
Positive associations imply that the service in question constitutes
ariskfactorforcomputersrunningthespecificservice.Thiscouldbe
the result of one of two possible scenarios: a) direct association, in
which the service is directly responsible for the host being compro-
mised, b) indirect association, where the presence of the associated
service correlates with the factors that are the true cause of the host’s
infection (note that associations can also be false-positives due to
Table I | Case-control framework. Contingency table for the evalu-
ation of an association between the presence of a given network
service and the infection by a given threat
running the service not runningtheservice
infected by the threat Ak
lz
    Ak
l{
   
threat not detected in host Ck
lz
    Ck
l{
   
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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thatthisisatplayinourdata).Negativeassociationsindicatethatthe
service is significantly unlikely to be present on compromised hosts.
Insuchcases,itistheabsenceoftheservicewhichcorrelateswiththe
cause of the intrusion. Hence, the specific service may play an effec-
tive ‘‘protective’’ role.
Since network services represent a small subset of a system’s char-
acteristics, some of the identified associations will be indirect. An
example is given by the JBoss Worm in Figure 2b. This threat affects
the Red Hat Java Application Server, which typically runs behind a
web server. Accordingly, the service http is present in an average of
2.55 instances in compromised hosts, while only 0.4 times in those
unaffected. vmware-auth and flexlm, which are respectively 23 and
164 times more likely to be present in infected computers, also indi-
cate that these hosts are part of a virtualized network that makes use
oftheapplicationserver.Eventhoughthepresenceoftheossec-agent
(a host-based intrusion detection system 354 times more likely to be
found in compromised hosts) is intended to mitigate intrusions, it is
also an indication that these are servers maintained by administra-
tors, consistent with the presence of a JBoss Application Server. The
association of all these services with the JBoss worm at high signifi-
canceconstitutesanindirectassociationthroughtheirco-occurrence
with the actual causal factor.
Nevertheless, giventhatnetworkservicesarethepointofentryfor
many viruses and network intrusions, we expect many of these asso-
ciations to be direct. For example, the threat ASP.NET NULL Byte
Injection Information Disclosure Vulnerability (CVE-2007-0042,
CVE-2011-3416) shows high significance for the association with
the remoting service, which mediates communications in the .NET
Framework. Since this service is used by ASP.NET for communica-
tions between server and client, it could plausibly provide an entry
pointforthepotentialattack,andthusconstituteadirectassociation.
Since there are alternative setups for this system (for example, using
Windows Communication Foundation) blocking traffic for this ser-
vice could have a measurable impact on the network’s susceptibility
to this threat, which would provide experimental evidence for this
association.
Validation
The group of services whose p-value for a given threat lay above the
statistical threshold are risk factors, implying that hosts running
theseserviceshaveasignificantlyhigherlikelihoodofbeingcompro-
mised by the threat. To assess the predictive power of the proposed
procedure, wedivide our hostsinto two cohortsof equalsize, chosen
randomly.Weuseonecohortasacalibrationsample,identifying the
riskfactors(services)associatedwitheachthreat.Theothercohortis
used to measure the effect of running the associated risk-factor ser-
vices on the likelihood of being compromised by each threat.
Specifically, after obtaining the list of associated risk-factor services
from the calibration cohort, we identify the hosts in the test cohort
which are running at least one of the associated services (exposed
hosts). We then compare the proportion of hosts that have been
compromised by the threat amongst the exposed hosts with the
proportion amongst unexposed hosts. This allows us to establish
the probability that the observed proportions stem from the same
Figure 2 | UsingGWAStoidentifythreat-serviceassociations.Manhattanplotsforthreethreats.Foreachservicealongthehorizontalaxis,thenegative
logarithm of the association p-value is displayed vertically. The dotted line denotes the threshold for statistical significance. The color of each dot
correspondstothesignofthelogarithmofthecorrespondingoddsratio.Reddotsabovethethresholdrepresenttheservicesthatarepositivelyassociated
with the corresponding threat. Green dots indicate that the service’s absence correlates with the threat. The ordering of the services along the horizontal
axis is aleatory.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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that any distinction between exposed and unexposed hosts in the
test cohorts are due to chance, or equivalently, the probability that
the associated services obtained have no predictive power over the
probabilityofinfection.Asanexample,considerthecaseoftheJBoss
worm. Analyzing the calibration cohort, we find that the services
most significantly associated with the worm are vmware-auth, net-
bios-ssn, flexlm and ossec-agent. In the test cohort, 641 hosts are
running at least one of these three services, 119 of which (18.5%)
werecompromised bythethreat.Amongsttheremaining 5222hosts
that are not running any of these services, only 104 (1.9%) were
compromised by the threat, a factor of ten difference. Thus, with a
p-value of 2.44 3 10
258, hosts running any of these three services
have significantly increased likelihood of being infected by the JBoss
worm,indicatingtheeffectivenessofthemethodtodetectsusceptible
hosts.
For 24 threats we successfully identified at least one risk-factor
service, finding that 17 of these show statistical significance in the
validation. The extent to which corresponding predictions about the
incidence of threats in exposed hosts are reliable can be evaluated by
comparing the odds ratios in both cohorts for each group of exposed
hosts. In Figure 3 we show the odds ratio of each threat as measured
ineachcohort.Inbothcases,exposedhostsarethoserunningatleast
one of the associated risk-factor services, obtained using data from
the calibration cohort only. Although some variability between
cohorts is observed, there is good agreement between the two
cohorts, meaning that predictions made on the basis of one group
of hosts can be carried over reliably to other hosts.
Implementations
As we have shown above, the proposed statistical framework can be
used to make predictions about the threat profile of a computer. If a
host is automatically scanned when it connects to the network, the
method allows us to immediately determine the list of threats by
which the computer has an increased likelihood of being compro-
mised. Therefore, packet inspection and traffic control can be tai-
lored accordingly, offering a more efficient allocation of resources.
Asforprophylacticmeasuresatthenetworklevel,thismethodcan
be used to design firewall rules with reliable information about their
potential effects on the probabilities of compromise. By identifying
all the hosts running a high risk-factor service, one can concentrate
resources on enacting stringent controls over a minimal number of
hosts to obtain a maximal reduction in threat incidence. For the
example of the JBoss worm, we identify the service ossec-agent as
the most significantly associated risk-factor and having the highest
odds ratio. This is a surprising finding given that the purpose of this
software is to protect the host from intrusions, and it illustrates how
this approach can help find unexpected correlations. Only 1.9% of
the computers in the network run this service. Ensuring security
againstthe JBossWorm for thesehostsalone couldreduce theincid-
ence of this threat by as much as 47%. Considering combinations of
services allows us to fine-tune the degree of acceptable interventions
to obtain a desired threat-reduction. For example, in Table II we
show the percentage of computers one needs to effectively secure
to attain different percentages of reduction in incidence of the
JBoss worm if we consider hosts that are running a minimum num-
Figure 3 | Validating the GWAS predictions. Hosts running risk factor services are predicted to have significantly increased likelihoods of infection.
These predictions are also valid for hosts that were excluded from the calculations. The plot shows the odds ratios corresponding to the predicted
vulnerable hosts for each threat, measured in both the calibration and the test cohorts. The agreement between the two cohorts indicates that the
information obtained from one sample can be used to make reliable predictions about other computers.
Table II | Host protection and threat reduction. If we can ensure the
safety of a subset of the network by stringent control (or limit risk by
blocking access to the hosts), we can calculate the resulting reduc-
tion in the incidence of a given threat. The desired degree of reduc-
tion in threat incidence determines a threshold for selecting hosts
according to the risk factor services they run. This table shows the
expectedreductionsintheincidenceoftheJBosswormbymeansof
different selection criteria
Number of risk-factors Covered hosts Threat reduction
at least 1 66.6% 98.9%
at least 5 14% 79.5%
at least 9 2.1% 45.1%
at least 12 1.7% 40%
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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carries a trade-off between the scope of an intervention and the
resulting threat reduction.
Of course, infallible prevention can hardly be achieved without
resorting to drastic interventions, such as removing or otherwise
isolating the host from the network. With a better understanding
of the causality between threats and services, much less intrusive
measures could be implemented with comparable results.
Discussion
In this paper we introduced a novel way to identify and quantify the
susceptibilityofindividualcomputerstocyber-threatsintermsofthe
network services that they run. We do so by establishing a direct
mapping between the threat susceptibility problem and that of iden-
tifyingstatisticalassociationsbetweengenesanddiseasesinhumans.
The adopted approach relies on the methodologies developed in
GWAS, aiming to associate genes with specific diseases.
Efficient and sophisticated tools to detect software vulnerabilities
in a host are already available and used widely. However, they are
limited to known and well-documented vulnerabilities, and their
ability to evaluate the risks of compromise rely on heuristic metrics.
Thestatisticalapproach developed here allows ustoidentify associa-
tions without preconceived assumptions about the underlying
mechanisms. We can therefore explore the whole range of the vari-
ables that we consider (in this case, network services) in search for
risk factors that may have been overlooked before. Such ‘‘agnostic’’,
data-driven approaches are particularly valuable for making predic-
tionsinreal-worldscenarios,astheybypasstheneedformechanistic
explanations and contextual knowledge. Since we consider effective
frequencies of infection in vivo, not only technical factors, but also
behavioral, environmental and exogenous factors are automatically
taken into account. For this reason, the proposed method offers
reliable predictions about the effects of specific changes in the net-
work in real-world environments.
The basis for this method resides in the observation that the net-
work services running on a host play a defining role in its suscept-
ibility to certain threats. This is not to deny that other variables may
be equally important. Note, however, that our framework is not
limited to services: if the appropriate data on other risk factors
becomes available (e.g., operating system, accounts and privileges,
hardware and peripheral devices, applications, drivers, manufac-
turer, etc.), our method can determine their role for specific threats.
Nevertheless, itis remarkablethat suchhighstatisticalsignificance is
observed using only services as risk factors. In contrast to other
methods to assess risks that involve in-depth scanning, for which
the collection of data can often be intrusive and even disruptive, the
kind of data that our approach requires can be easily and system-
atically collected.
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